Periodic Patrols on the Line and Other Networks by Alpern, Steve et al.
Periodic Patrols on the Line and Other Networks
Steve Alpern1, Thomas Lidbetter2 and Katerina Papadaki3
1ORMS Group, Warwick Business School,
University of Warwick, Coventry CV4, UK
2Department of Management Science and Information Systems,
Rutgers Business School, NJ 07102, USA
3Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics,
London WC2A 2AE, UK
October 16, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
10
39
9v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
9 M
ay
 20
17
Abstract
We consider a patrolling game on a graph recently introduced by Alpern et al. (2011)
where the Patroller wins if he is at the attacked node while the attack is taking place.
This paper studies the periodic patrolling game in the case that the attack duration is
two periods. We show that if the Patroller’s period is even, the game can be solved on
any graph by finding the fractional covering number and fractional independence number
of the graph. We also give a complete solution to the periodic patrolling game on line
graphs of arbitrary size, extending the work of Papadaki et al. (2016) to the periodic
domain. This models the patrolling problem on a border or channel, which is related to
a classical problem of operational research going back to Morse and Kimball (1951). A
periodic patrol is required to start and end at the same location, for example the place
where the Patroller leaves his car to begin a foot patrol.
1 Introduction
The periodic patrolling game was introduced in Alpern et al. (2011) to model the defense
of the nodes of a network from attack by an antagonistic opponent. This is a discrete
game model in which the network is modeled as a graph, the Patroller chooses a walk
on the graph with a given period and the Attacker picks a node and a discrete time
interval of fixed duration m for his attack. The Patroller wins the game if he is present
at the attacked node during the time interval in which it is attacked, in which case we
say that he intercepts the attack. Otherwise the Attacker wins. Compared with other
patrolling models in the literature, for example Chung et al. (2011), the patrolling game
model represents only an idealization of the patrolling problem. However it is the only
model in which the Patroller and Attacker are treated symmetrically, rather than the
more usual Stackelberg approach where the Patroller picks his strategy first.
This paper considers the periodic patrolling game on general graphs and then in more
detail on the class of line graphs Ln consisting of n nodes 1, 2, . . . , n with consecutive
numbers considered to be adjacent. The case of a unit attack duration m = 1 is covered
by the field of geometric games as defined by Ruckle (1983), so we here consider the
next smallest duration m = 2, which is the only case thus far susceptible to analysis.
We note that the easier version of non-periodic patrolling games is able to handle line
graphs for larger values of m, as recently solved by Papadaki et al. (2016). It is likely
that the techniques introduced here will be extended to larger attack durations in the
future, but clearly additional ideas will be required.
In the case of the line graph, our discrete model could be applied for example to the
problem of patrolling, possibly with a sniffer dog, a bank of linearly arranged airport
security scanners, or a mountainous border with a discrete set of passes that can be
crossed. In such cases, the “nodes” can be attacked at any time, around the clock, so
the period T is likely to be the number of nodes that can be patrolled in a day. Other
possiblities for defining T might be the attention span of the sniffer dog or the time
between refueling by a mobile vehicle, robot or UAV.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature,
then in Section 3 we formally define the game. In Section 4 we discuss some results for
general graphs, showing how the game can be solved using notions from fractional graph
theory if the patrol period is even. We then give a complete solution to the game played
on a line graph in Section 5. In Section 6 we consider an extension of the game to the
case of multiple patrollers, and show how our results on the line may be extended to
this setting. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
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2 Literature review
As stated in the abstract, the problem of patrolling a border or channel against attack or
infiltration goes back to the classical work of Morse and Kimball (1951). Since then many
attempts have been made to improve the theory and practice of patrolling. Washburn
(1982) considers an infiltrator who wants to maximize the probability of getting across
a line in a channel. The case where the channel is blocked by fixed barriers has been
consider by Baston and Bostock (1987) and the case when the barriers are moving has
been analyzed by Washburn (2010). The case of a thick infiltrator has been considered
by Baston and Kikuta (2009). If there are many infiltrators and they arrive in a Poisson
manner, the analysis is given by Szechtman et al. (2008). Multiple infiltrators are also
considered by Zoroa et al. (2012) where the infiltration is through a circular rather than
a linear boundary. Multiple patrollers, when only some portions of the boundary need
to be protected, are considered by Collins et al. (2013), who show how the problem
can be divided up. Papadaki et al. (2016) consider the discrete border patrol problem,
where the infiltration can only be accomplished at certain points of the border (perhaps
mountain passes). When patrollers are restricted to periodic patrols, as here, the analysis
of the continuous problem (with elements such as turning radius included) has been
analyzed by Chung et al. (2011).
The more general problem of patrolling an arbitrary network against attacks at its
nodes has been modeled as a game by Alpern et al. (2011), including a definition of
the periodic patrolling game which we adopt here. Lin et al. (2013) developed more
general approximate methods which cover such extensions as varying values for attacks
at different nodes. Their methods, extended in Lin et al. (2014) to imperfect detection,
can solve large scale problems. In the computer science literature, patrolling games with
mobile robots and a Stackelberg model have been developed by Basilico et al. (2009,
2012). Multi vehicle patrolling problems have been solved by Hochbaum et al. (2014).
Infiltration games without mobile patrollers are analyzed in Garnaev et al. (1997),
Alpern (1992), Baston and Garnaev (1996) and Baston and Kikuta (2004, 2009).
3 Formal Definition of the (periodic) Patrolling Game
In this section we formally define the patrolling game. There are three parameters: a
graph Q = Q(N,E) (where N is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges of Q),
a period T , and an attack duration m (which we will take as 2 in this paper). The
Attacker chooses a node i of Q to attack and a time interval of m consecutive periods
in which to attack it. These m periods can be considered as an arc of the time circle
T = {1, 2, . . . , T, T + 1 = 1}, on which arithmetic is carried out modulo T . So in the
periodic game with T = 24 and m = 5, for example, a valid Attacker strategy would be
the “overnight” attack, with attack interval J = {22, 23, 24, 1, 2}. Note that if Q has n
2
nodes, then the number of possible attacks is given by nT, and the mixed attack strategy
which chooses among them equiprobably will be called the uniform attack strategy. To
foil the attack, the Patroller walks along the graph in an attempt to intercept it, that
is, to be at the attacked node at some time during the attack interval. More precisely, a
patrol is a walk w on Q with period T , that is, w : {1, 2, . . .} → N with w(t) and w(t+1)
the same or adjacent nodes and w (t+ T ) = w (T ) for all t. A patrol w intercepts an
attack at node i during attack interval J if i ∈ w (J) or equivalently if w (t) = i for some
time t in the attack interval J . In such a case we say that the Patroller wins, and the
payoff is 1; otherwise we say the Attacker wins, and the payoff is 0. Thus the payoff of the
game corresponding to mixed strategies is the probability that the Patroller intercepts
the attack. The value V of the game is the expected payoff (interception probability)
with optimal play on both sides.
We note that in Alpern et al. (2011), this game is called the periodic patrolling game
(one of two forms of the game considered there) and the value is denoted V p. We assume
throughout that the period is at least 2 and that the graph Q has at least n = 2 nodes.
4 General Graphs
In this section we obtain some bounds on the value V of the patrolling game on a general
graph. The tools comprise the well known covering and independence numbers and a
decomposition result taken from Alpern et al. (2011).
4.1 Covering and independence numbers I and C.
We recall some elementary definitions about a graph Q. A set of nodes is called inde-
pendent if no two of them are adjacent. The maximum cardinality of an independent set
is called the independence number I. Similarly a set of edges is called a covering set if
every node of the graph is incident to one of these edges. The minimum cardinality of a
covering set is called the covering number C of the graph. It is well known that I ≤ C.
Suppose the Attacker attacks in some fixed time interval {t, t+ 1} at a node chosen
equiprobably from a set of I independent nodes. We call this an independent attack
strategy. If a patrol intercepts one of these attacks at node i ∈ I at time t, he cannot
intercept another at time t + 1, since none of the other attacks are at a node adjacent
to i. Hence the probability of intercepting an attack cannot exceed 1/I and therefore
V ≤ 1/I. Next suppose T is even. In this case the Patroller fixes a covering set of C
edges, picks a single edge amongst these randomly, and on that edge goes back and forth
in an oscillations of length T . We call this Patroller mixed strategy an unbiased covering
strategy, or, if the covering set is only an edge, an unbiased oscillation. Every node is
visited by one of these patrols in every pair of consecutive time periods, and hence every
attack of duration m = 2 is intercepted by at least one of these C patrols. Therefore the
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Patroller wins with probability at least 1/C. Hence we have shown the following.
Lemma 1 The value of the Patrolling Game on any graph Q satisfies
V ≤ 1/I, and futhermore (1)
1/C ≤ V ≤ 1/I, if T is even. (2)
A graph is called bipartite if its nodes can be partitioned into two sets such that no
two nodes within the same set are adjacent. For bipartite graphs, we can say more.
Proposition 2 Let Q be a bipartite graph. Then C = I and the value V satisfies
V =
1
C =
1
I , if T is even, and (3)(
2T − 1
2T
)
1
C =
(
2T − 1
2T
)
1
I ≤ V ≤
1
I if T is odd. (4)
Proof. The first result (3) follows immediately from (2) and the well known fact
(Konig’s Theorem) that C = I for bipartite graphs. The upper bound of (4) follows from
(1). For the lower bound let {ek}Ck=1 be a covering set of C edges, and let wk denote the
randomized walk of period T which oscillates on ek except that it stays at a randomly
chosen node of ek for two consecutive times, also randomly chosen. We call this strategy
of the Patroller a biased covering strategy. For example if T = 7 and the endpoints of
ek are a and b, the repeated sequence might be ababbab. Consider the Patroller strategy
that chooses one of the randomized walks wk equiprobably. If one of the nodes of ek
is attacked then the attack is detected if the Patroller chooses wk (which happens with
probabiliy 1/C) and the Patroller does not happen to choose to repeat this node for two
consecutive periods that coincide with the time of attack (this happens with probability
1− 1/(2T ). So the total probabilty the attack is detected is (1/C) (1− 1/ (2T )), giving
the lower bound for the value in (4).
We now give an example based on Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 for the line graph
L7 with nodes {1, . . . , 7} and edges (i, i + 1) i = 1, . . . , 6. Since Ln is bipartite we can
use the result in (3). We demonstrate the result for even period T = 12 (any even
period would suffice but we pick 12 to be able to compare it with a later example in
Section 5.8). A minimum covering set is {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6), (6, 7)} and thus C = 4. An
unbiased covering strategy for the Patroller consists of picking an edge at random from
a minimum covering set (with probability 1/4) and performing an oscillation on that
edge with period T = 12. Since T = 12 is even the oscillations performed on the chosen
edges are unbiased (nodes are visited equally often). This is demonstrated in Figure 1.
This Patroller strategy intercepts attacks at nodes 1− 5, 7 with probability 1/4 and at
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node 6 with probability 1/2. Thus, the Patroller at worst can guarantee interception
probability of at least 1/4. The Attacker would use the independent attack strategy and
attack equiprobably on the independent set {1, 3, 5, 7}, which clearly guarantees him
interception probability of at most 1/4. This gives the value of the game V = 1/C = 1/4.
1                2                 3                4                 5                6                7
1/4                               1/4                               1/4            1/4
Figure 1: Unbiased covering strategy for the Patroller to oscillate on edges
{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6), (6, 7)} of this minimum covering set.
The following gives an alternative upper bound to 1/I on V based on the uniform
attack strategy, which chooses equiprobably among the nT possible attacks (pure strate-
gies). The reason that there are nT pure strategies is because in a game with period T ,
there are T periods that the attacker can start the attack: 1, 2, . . . , T, T + 1 = 1, at each
node. The new upper bound is sometimes but not always better (lower) than 1/I.
Proposition 3 Suppose the Attacker adopts the uniform strategy on a graph Q. Then
no Patroller pure strategy w(t) can intercept more than 2T of the Attacker’s pure strate-
gies, and no more than 2T − 1 of them if T is odd and Q is bipartite. So,
V ≤ 2
n
and V ≤ 2T − 1
nT
if T odd, Q bipartite.
Proof. If w(t) = i and w(t+ 1) = j 6= i then in these two periods w can intercept at
most four pure Attacker strategies, namely [i, (t − 1, t)], [i, (t, t + 1)] and [j, (t, t + 1))],
[j, (t+ 1, t+ 2))], so 2 in each period and 2T in all. If i = j then only the three attacks
[i, (t−1, t)], [i, (t, t+1)] and [i, (t+1, t+2)] can be intercepted. But if T is odd and Q is
bipartite then w(t) = w(t+ 1) for some t, so at most 2T − 1 attacks can be intercepted.
Since there are nT possible attacks, we have V ≤ 2T
nT
= 2
n
and V ≤ 2T−1
nT
if T is odd and
Q is bipartite.
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Note that it follows from the proof of Proposition 3 that against the uniform attack
strategy, the interception probability will be strictly less than 2/n for any Patroller
walk which repeats a node. This observation can be used to show that in some cases
oscillations on an edge cannot be optimal. Consider the triangle graph shown in Figure 2,
with T = 3. If the Patroller adopts a random cyclic patrol, he intercepts any attack
with probability 2/3. Similarly, Proposition 3 shows that the uniform attack strategy
is intercepted by any walk with probability not exceeding 2/3, and so V = 2/3. On
the other hand, if the Patroller uses oscillations on edges (or any walks other than
the cycles), then he has repeated vertices and by the above remark cannot achieve
interception probability 2/3. So this example shows that in general, the Patroller cannot
restrict to walks restricted to individual edges.
Figure 2: The triangle graph
The following situation will be important in analyzing the patrolling game on the n
node line graph Ln with n even. For example, consider the edge covering of L4 consisting
of the edges (1, 2) and (3, 4) with C = 2 = n/2. The covering edges are disjoint, unlike
the graph of Figure 1.
Proposition 4 Suppose T is odd, n is even and let Q be a bipartite graph with C = n/2.
Then
V = (2T − 1) / (nT ) .
Proof. Since C = n/2, we have from (4) that
V ≥ (2T − 1)
2CT =
2 (2T − 1)
2nT
=
2T − 1
nT
The result follows since for odd T we have from Proposition 3 that V ≤ (2T − 1) / (nT ).
6
4.2 Even Periods T
When the period T is even, we can solve the patrolling game on any graph Q = Q (N,E)
(where N is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges of Q) by extending the notions
of covering and independence numbers to fractional forms. A more explicit solution for
even T will be obtained later for line graphs.
Let µ : E → [0, 1] assign edge weights µ (e) to every edge e so that the total weight
µˆ =
∑
e∈Eµ (e) is minimized subject to the condition that for every node i ∈ N the
weights µ (e) of the edges e incident to i sum to at least 1. Such a µ is called an optimal
edge weighting and µˆ is called the fractional covering number.
Similarly let ν : N → [0, 1] assign node weights ν (i) to every node i so that the
total weight νˆ =
∑
iν (i) is maximized subject to the condition that sum of the weights
ν (i) of the two endpoints i of every edge e is at most 1. Such a ν is called an optimal
node weighting and νˆ is called the fractional independence number. It is well known
that µˆ = νˆ, a result that follows from either duality theory or the minimax theorem
applied to the game where the maximizer picks an edge, the minimizer picks a node and
the payoff is 1 if the node is incident to the edge and 0 otherwise. Note that, since the
number of strategies in this game is polynomial in the number of nodes of the graph, an
optimal edge weighting, an optimal node weighting and µˆ = νˆ can be found efficiently.
Theorem 5 If T is even, then the value of the patrolling game is given by
V = 1/µˆ = 1/νˆ.
An optimal strategy for the Patroller is to oscillate on edge e with probability µ (e) /µˆ,
where µ is any optimal edge weighting. An optimal strategy for Attacker to fix any
interval {t, t+ 1} and attack at node i with probabiltiy ν (i) /νˆ, where ν is an optimal
node weighting.
Proof. Suppose the Patroller chooses the stated mixed strategy and the attack is
at node i, in any time interval. The Patroller will intercept the attack if he has chosen
to oscillate on an interval incident to i, which has probability at least 1/µˆ because the
numerater is the sum of weights on edges incident to i. Similarly, suppose the Attacker
adopts the stated mixed strategy. Let i and j be the nodes occupied by the Patroller
at the attack times t and t + 1. If i 6= j, and e = {i, j} is the edge determined by
i 6= j then the probability of intercepting the attack is given by ν (i) /νˆ + ν (j) /νˆ =
(ν (i) + ν (j)) /νˆ ≤ 1/νˆ. If i = j the same inequality holds.
Note that if we restrict the weights µ(e) and ν(i) to being 0 or 1 we get the usual cov-
ering number µˆ = C and independence number νˆ = I. Thus, from linear programming
theory and duality we have: I ≤ νˆ = µˆ ≤ C.
We consider, as an example, the graph depicted in Figure 3. It is not bipartite, so
the covering number and independence number are not equal. The covering number
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Figure 3: A non-bipartite graph
is 3, and an optimal covering is {ab, ac, de} (where, for example ab denotes the edge
with endpoints a and b). The independence number of the graph is 2, and a maximum
cardinality independent set is {a, d}.
One optimal edge weighting is µ (ae) = 1, µ (bc) = µ (cd) = µ (db) = 1/2 and an
optimal node weighting is given by ν (a) = ν (b) = ν (c) = ν (d) = ν (e) = 1/2. Hence
µˆ = νˆ = 5/2. This translates to an optimal Patroller strategy that oscillates on ae
with probability µ(ae)/µˆ = 2/5, and oscillates on bc, cd or bd each with probability
µ(bc)/µˆ = 1/5. And it translates to an optimal Attacker strategy of attacking at node
i with probability ν(i)/νˆ = 1/5, which is equivalent to the uniform Attacker strategy.
We have V = 1/µˆ = 1/νˆ = 1/(5/2) = 2/5.
4.3 Patroller decomposition
As observed earlier in Alpern et al. (2011) the Patroller has the option of decomposing
the given graph Q into subgraphs Q1 and Q2 and randomly choosing whether to play
an optimal patrolling strategy on Q1 or on Q2. Specifically, suppose we write the node
set N of Q as the (not necessarily disjoint) union N1 ∪ N2, and define Qi to be the
graph with nodes Ni and edges between nodes that are adjacent in Q. Let Vi denote
the value of the patrolling game on Qi (with the same parameters as on Q). If the
Patroller optimally patrols on Qi with probability pi, then any attack on a node in Qi
will be intercepted with probability at least piVi. If the Patroller equalizes these two
probabilities (p1V1 = p2V2) by choosing p1 = V2/ (V1 + V2), then he wins with probability
at least
p2V2 = p1V1 =
V1V2
V1 + V2
, and hence we have
V ≥ V1V2
V1 + V2
. (5)
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The right-hand side of (5) represents the highest interception probability that the
Patroller can obtain by restricting patrols to one of the two subgraphs Q1 or Q2. So if
strict inequality holds in (5) then it is suboptimal for the Patroller to decompose Q in
this way. If (5) holds with equality, we say that the patrolling game on Q with period
T is decomposable. Note that if the game for Q, T is decomposable this means that
removing edges (or barring the Patroller from using them) connecting nodes in Q1 to
nodes in Q2 does not lower the value of the game.
This derivation is simpler than that given in Alpern et al. (2011). We will use this
method to solve one of the cases for the line graph in Section 5.5.
Consider the example in Figure 3. Take N1 = {a, e} and N2 = {b, c, d} . We have
V1 = 1 (an oscillation intercepts any attack at a or e) and V2 = 2/3, as shown in the
analysis of the triangle graph in Figure 2. Using the decomposition result (5), we have
V ≥ V1 V2
V1 + V2
=
2/3
1 + 2/3
=
2
5
and Proposition 3 gives
V ≤ 2
n
=
2
5
, so V = 2/5,
as shown earlier in the analysis of Figure 3, using different methods.
5 The Line Graph
We now concentrate our attention on the line graph Ln with node set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and edges between consecutive numbers. This graph is bipartite, with the two node sets
made up of the odd numbers and the even numbers. As mentioned in Proposition 2,
this implies that I = C, and we may take the odd numbered nodes as a maximum
independent set, giving
I = C =

n
2
, if n is even, and
n+1
2
, if n is odd.
(6)
The solution of the periodic patrolling game on the line breaks up into five cases, as
outlined in Table 1. For the Attacker the strategies are simpler and have been defined
earlier. However, for the Patroller the strategies are more complicated and specific
details for some of them can be found at the corresponding propositions.
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Case Description Value Patroller strategy Attacker strategy
1 T, n even 2n unbiased covering strategy independent
Proposition 6 Lemma 1 Lemma 1
2 T even, n odd 2n+1 unbiased covering strategy independent
Propostion 6 Lemma 1 Lemma 1
3 T odd, n even 2T−1nT biased covering strategy uniform
Proposition 6 Proposition 2 Proposition 3
4 T, n odd, n ≥ 2T − 1 2T−1nT mixture of p-biased oscillations uniform
Propositions 9, 11 (Prop 9) or decomposed (Prop 11) Prop 7, Fig 5
5 T, n odd, n ≤ 2T − 1 2n+1 mixture of p-biased oscillations independent
Proposition 10 Proposition 10 Prop 7, Fig 5
Table 1: Solution of Patrolling Game on Ln, period T .
We give below in Figure 4 a partition of (n, T ) into the five cases of Table 1. The
pattern is quite complicated.
T \ n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
3 3 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 3
4 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 4 3
6 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
7 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3
8 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
9 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3
10 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
Figure 4: Cases from Table 1 for pairs of (n, T ).
5.1 Cases 1 to 3 (one of T or n is even)
If either T or n is even, there are three different forms for the value, but all follow easily
from previous results.
Proposition 6 For Ln, if T is even, then
V =
1
C =

2
n
if n is even,
2
n+1
if n is odd.
(7)
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If T is odd and n is even we have
V =
2T − 1
nT
. (8)
Proof.
First suppose that T is even. In this case, the result (7) easily follows from Proposi-
tion 2 and (6), since Ln is bipartite.
For T odd and n even, there is an edge covering of Ln with C = n/2 disjoint edges
of the form {2i− 1, 2i} , i = 1, . . . , n/2. Thus the result follows from Proposition 4.
Thus the only remaining cases (4 and 5) are when T and n are both odd. These are
the complicated cases.
5.2 Comparison of uniform and independent attack strategies
For the remaining cases when T and n are both odd, we must compare the effectiveness
of two different strategies for the Attacker: the uniform strategy, mentioned above,
chooses equiprobably among all the nT possible pure stategies (at all n nodes at all T
starting times); the independent strategy starts at time, say, 1 and chooses equiprobably
among the I independent nodes. That is, the independent strategy chooses among I
simultaneous attacks. We have already obtained two different upper bounds on V for
these cases: (2T − 1) / (nT ) from Proposition 3, for the uniform attack strategy; and
2/ (n+ 1) from (4), for the independent strategy (since I = n+1
2
). In general, neither of
these is the better (lower) bound, as can be seen in Figure 5.
12 13 14 15
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
Figure 5: Plots of 2/(n+ 1) (solid) and (2T − 1)/(nT ) (dashed), T = 7, n = 11, . . . , 15.
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Note that the two curves intersect at n = 2T − 1 (at n = 13 in the figure). Since the
Attacker can choose the attack (uniform or independent) which gives the smaller upper
bound on the value, we can summarize his options as follows.
Proposition 7 Suppose T and n are both odd, and Q = Ln. Then
V ≤ min
(
2T − 1
nT
,
2
n+ 1
)
=

2
n+1
if n ≤ 2T − 1,
2T−1
nT
if n ≥ 2T − 1.
We now analyze these two cases for n separately, beginning with n ≤ 2T − 1. For
the Patroller strategies we shall use oscillations which are similar to the walks wk which
appeared in the proof of Proposition 2.
5.3 Case 4 (T, n odd, n ≥ 2T − 1)
To deal with the case of n ≥ 2T − 1 and noting the the oddness of T requires a stunted
type of oscillation, we define p-biased oscillations as follows.
Definition 8 For p ∈ [0, 1], a right p-biased oscillation −→b p(i) (for i = 1, . . . , n− 1)
is a T -periodic walk between i and i + 1 where i and i + 1 alternate except that with
probability p, at a random time, the right-hand node i + 1 is repeated (if T = 2q + 1,
it is at node i + 1 for q + 1 periods and at i for q periods); with probability 1 − p, at a
random time, the left-hand node is repeated. For convenience, we define a left p-biased
oscillation
←−
b p(i) as
−→
b 1−p(i). If p = 1/2, we will refer to a right (or left) p-biased
oscillation as an unbiased oscillation.
For the following result note that for larger n the uniform attack strategy is better
for the Attacker than the independent attack strategy.
Proposition 9 For Ln, assume that both T and n are odd and that 2T ≤ n+ 1. Then
V =
2T − 1
nT
.
The uniform attack strategy is optimal for the Attacker and a probabilistic choice of
biased oscillations is optimal for the Patroller.
The reader is invited to read the example in Table 2 and commentary to obtain some
intuition for the proof.
Proof. From Proposition 7 we know that V ≤ 2T−1
nT
, so it is enough to demonstrate
a Patroller strategy which intercepts an attack at any node i with probability at least
2T−1
nT
.
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For j = 1, . . . , (n + 1)/2, let Aj be the set of edges of the form (2i − 1, 2i) for
i < j. For example, A1 is empty and A3 = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}. Also let Bj be the set
of edges of the form (2i, 2i + 1) for i ≥ j, so B1 = {(2, 3), (4, 5), . . . , (n − 1, n)} and
B3 = {(6, 7), (8, 9), . . . , (n− 1, n)}. Finally let Dj = Aj ∪Bj.
For example when n = 7 we have A2 = {(1, 2)} , B2 = {(4, 5), (6, 7)} and D2 =
{(1, 2), (4, 5), (6, 7)} , as shown by the three arrows (for edges) on the second line from
the top in Table 2. The arrows are oriented left for edges in A2 and right for those in
B2 to indicate the Patroller’s use of left or right biased oscillations on these edges in his
optimal strategy.
There are (n − 1)/2 edges in Dj, and each node in the line graph except one is
incident to some edge in Dj, for each j.
Consider the following Patroller strategy. First some j is chosen uniformly at random,
j = 1, . . . , (n+1)/2 and an edge (i, i+1) in Dj is chosen uniformly at random. If (i, i+1)
is contained in Aj then the Patroller performs a left p-biased oscillation
←−
b p(i). If (i, i+1)
is in Bj then the Patroller performs a right p-biased oscillation
−→
b p(i). This probability
p will be determined later.
If a node is either on the left of an edge in some Aj that is being patrolled or if it is
on the right of an edge in some Bj that is being patrolled, then an attack at that node
is intercepted with probability:
p · 1 + (1− p) · (T − 1)/T = (T + p− 1)/T. (9)
If a node is either on the right of an edge in some Aj that is being patrolled or if it is
on the left of an edge in some Bj that is being patrolled, then an attack at that node is
intercepted with probability:
p · (T − 1)/T + (1− p) · 1 = (T − p)/T. (10)
We first calculate the probability p2i that an attack at an even numbered node 2i is
intercepted, i = 1, . . . , (n− 1)/2. Observe that for every one of the (n + 1)/2 values of
j, the node 2i is either on the right of an edge in Aj or on the left of an edge in Bj, so
p2i =
(
1
(n− 1)/2
)(
T − p
T
)
=
2(T − p)
(n− 1)T . (11)
For an odd numbered node 2i−1, i = 1, . . . , (n+1)/2, we observe that there are (n−1)/2
values of j such that the node 2i− 1 is either on the left of an edge in Aj or on the right
of an edge in Bj. There is one value of j such that node 2i − 1 is not incident to any
edge in Aj or Bj. So the probability p2i−1 that an attack at node 2i− 1 is intercepted is
p2i−1 =
(
1
(n− 1)/2
)(
(n− 1)/2
(n+ 1)/2
)(
T + p− 1
T
)
=
2(T + p− 1)
(n+ 1)T
. (12)
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Since 2T ≤ n+ 1, we may choose p = (2T +n−1)/(2n) so that the probabilities p2i and
p2i−1 are equal, and substituting this value of p into (11) or (12), we obtain the bound
V ≥ 2(T − (2T + n− 1)/2n)
(n− 1)T =
(2T − 1)
nT
.
Combining this with our lower bound, this establishes the proposition.
We illustrate the Patroller’s optimal strategy, taking L7 as an example, with T = 3
in Table 2. The four choices of D1, . . . , D4 correspond to the four rows in Table 2. The
left pointing arrows correspond to the edges in the Aj and the right pointing arrows
correspond to the edges in the Bj. Nodes which are incident to one of the edges in Dj,
are indicated by a solid disk, those which are not, by an outlined disk.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
◦ • =⇒ • • =⇒ • • =⇒ • D1
• ⇐= • ◦ • =⇒ • • =⇒ • D2
• ⇐= • • ⇐= • ◦ • =⇒ • D3
• ⇐= • • ⇐= • • ⇐= • ◦ D4
Table 2: Optimal strategy for L7 with T = 3.
The Patroller picks one of the rows of the table at random, and then one of the arrows
in that row at random, corresponding to an edge (i, i+ 1). Equivalently, he picks one of
the 12 arrows at random. Then he performs a left or right p-biased oscillation, depending
on the direction of the arrow, where p = (2T +n−1)/(2n) = 12/14 = 6/7. If a node has
three arrows pointing toward it (odd nodes), then an attack at that node is intercepted
with probability (3/12)(p + (1 − p)(T − 1)/T ) = (1/4)(6/7 + (1/7)(2/3)) = 5/21. If,
on the other hand, a node has four arrows pointing away from it (even nodes), then
an attack at that node is intercepted with probability (4/12)((1 − p) + p(T − 1)/T ) =
(1/3)(1/7 + (6/7)(2/3)) = 5/21. So the value is 5/21 = (2T − 1)/(nT ).
5.4 Case 5 (T, n odd,n ≤ 2T − 1)
We now consider the remaining open case of n and T odd and n ≤ 2T − 1.
Proposition 10 For Ln, assume that both T and n are odd and that n ≤ 2T − 1. Then
V =
2
n+ 1
.
The independent strategy is optimal for the Attacker and a probabilistic choice of biased
oscillations is optimal for the Patroller.
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Proof. It follows from Proposition 7 that V ≤ 2/(n+1). To prove the reverse bound
on the value, we simply use the Patroller strategy described in the proof of Proposition 9,
but this time taking p = 1 in Equations (12) and (11) to obtain
p2i−1 =
2(T + p− 1)
(n+ 1)T
=
2
n+ 1
and p2i =
2(T − 1)
(n− 1)T ≥
2
n+ 1
,
where the last inequality follows directly from n ≤ 2T −1. Thus, we have V ≥ 2/(n+1).
5.5 Decomposed strategies
We may now also give an alternative optimal strategy for the Patroller in case 4, using
a decomposition of the line graph.
Proposition 11 For Ln, if T and n are odd and n > 2T − 1 then V = 2T−1nT . The
uniform strategy is optimal for the Attacker. For the Patroller there is an optimal strategy
which decomposes the graph Q = Ln into a left graph L = LnL with the odd number
nL = 2T − 1 of nodes {1, 2, . . . , 2T − 1} and a right graph R =LnRwith the remaining
even number nR = n− (2T − 1) of nodes {2T, 2T + 1, . . . , n} .
Proof. The adoption of the uniform attacker strategy guarantees that V ≥ 2T−1
nT
by Proposition 3. The left graph L satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 10, because
nL ≤ 2T − 1 (equality holds) and T and nL are odd. Hence Proposition 10 gives
V (L) = 2
nL + 1
=
2
2T
.
The subgraph R has an even number of nodes nR, so it satisfies the hypothesis of
Proposition 6, hence equation (8) gives
V (R) = 2T − 1
nRT
=
2T − 1
(n− (2T − 1))T .
It follows from the decomposition estimate (5) that
V = V (Ln) ≥ V (L) V (R)
V (L) + V (R) =
2T − 1
nT
.
As an example, consider again the case T = 3 and n = 7 > 2T −1 = 5, as considered
in Section 5.3. As we know, V7 = 5/21. We decompose L7 into L = L5 and R = L2.
On L5, the optimal Patroller strategy is given by Proposition 10. On L2 the optimal
Patroller strategy is an unbiased oscillation on the single edge (6, 7).
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According to Section 4.3, the probabilities p5 and p2 of patrolling on L5 and L2
should satisfy p5V5 = p2V2. Since V5 = 2/(5 + 1) = 1/3 and V2 = (2 ·3−1)/(2 ·3) = 5/6,
we have p5 = 5/7 and p2 = 2/7.
We may represent this strategy by the diagram in Table 3, where L7 is decomposed
into L = L5 (on the left) and R = L2 (on the right). The Patroller first chooses L5 with
probability p5 = 5/7 and L2 with probability 2/7. If he chooses L2 then he performs an
unbiased oscillation (indicated by the double-ended arrow) on edge (6, 7). If he chooses
L5 then he chooses one of the single-ended arrows at random and performs a left or right
biased p-oscillation, depending on the direction of the arrow, with p = 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
◦ • =⇒ • • =⇒ • • ⇐⇒ •
• ⇐= • ◦ • =⇒ • • ⇐⇒ •
• ⇐= • • ⇐= • ◦ • ⇐⇒ •
Table 3: Decomposed strategy for L7 with T = 3.
5.6 Decomposable patrolling games
We can now determine for which values of T and n the line graph Ln is decomposable
(equality in (5)), in the sense that the Patroller can restrict his patrols to one of two
disjoint subgraphs without loss of optimality.
Proposition 12 The patrolling game on the line is decomposable unless T and n are
odd and n ≤ 2T − 1 (case 5).
Proof. First we show that for cases 1through 4 in Table 1, the patrolling game is
decomposable (by the Patroller). In cases 1, 2 and 3, the Patroller uses what we call
covering strategies, in that his pure patrols are on edges forming a minimum covering
set. For n ≥ 4, such as set can include the edge (1, 2) and (3, 4) and in particular
the Patroller can avoid using the edge (2, 3) . It follows that he is decomposing Ln into
L = L2 and R = Ln−2 with disjoint nodes sets {1, 2} and {3, . . . , n} . (If T is even and
n = 3, then instead of using the covering strategy involving edges (1, 2) and (2, 3) , the
Patroller decomposes the game by equiprobably oscillating on edge (1, 2) and remaining
stationary on node 3 to obtain an interception probability of 1/2 = V (L3) .) For case
4, the optimal Patroller strategy given in Proposition 9 does not decompose the game.
However an optimal strategy which does decompose the game is given in Proposition 10,
where Ln, n odd, is decomposed into L = L2T−1 and R = Ln−(2T−1). This is a strategy
where the Patroller never traverses the edge (2T − 1, 2T ) .
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So assume that T and n are odd and n ≤ 2T − 1 (case 5). So any decomposition of
Ln is into an even node line graph L2j, j > 0 and an odd one Ln−2j. The assumptions
on T and n are covered by Proposition 9, so we have
V (Ln) =
2
n+ 1
.
Since 2j is even, it follows from (8) in Proposition 5, that
V (L2j) =
2T − 1
2jT
.
Since n− 2j is odd and n− 2j < n ≤ 2T − 1, it follows from Proposition 9 that
V (Ln−2j) =
2
(n− 2j) + 1.
The best the Patroller can do by such a decomposition (see Section 3.2) is to obtain an
interception probability of
V (L2j) ∗ V (Ln−2j)
V (L2j) + V (Ln−2j)
.
The difference between the unrestricted value and the restricted one is given above is
V (Ln)− V (L2j) ∗ V (Ln−2j)
V (L2j) + V (Ln−2j)
=
2
n+ 1
−
(
2T−1
2jT
)
∗
(
2
(n−2j)+1
)
(
2T−1
2jT
)
+
(
2
(n−2j)+1
)
=
4j
(n+ 1) (2j + (2T − 1) (1 + n)) > 0.
5.7 Limiting values for large periods T
Compared with games with simply a fixed time horizon T, the problem with period T
is more difficult for the Patroller, as he has the additional requirement that he has to
end at the same node as he started. However as the period gets large, this restriction
is less oppressive to the Patroller, because the amount of time he must use to get back
to his start is the fixed diameter of the graph. In this subsection we check that the
limiting value of V (T, n) for the game with period T approaches the value V (n) found
for the patrolling game on the graph Ln without periodic patrols. For m = 2 the values
found in Papadaki et al. (2016) are simply V (n) = 1/ dn/2e , that is, 2/n for even n
and 2/ (n+ 1) for odd n. If we look at the values V (T, n) for periodic patrols found for
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the five cases, looking back at Table 1, for cases 1, 2, 3 and 5 (case 4 does not hold as
T goes to infinity), we obtain the same limiting value
lim
T→∞
V (T, n) = V (n) = 1/ dn/2e , for all n.
Of course this is not an easy way of establishing the nonperiodic result, as the periodic
case dealt with here is more complicated.
5.8 Further connections with non-periodic game
The solution of the non-periodic game on Ln as given in Papadaki el al (2016) involves
periodic patrols of different periods T1, . . . , Tk. Setting T
∗ to be the least common
multiple of {T1, T2, . . . , Tk}, we see that the solution has period T ∗. If we were seeking
a solution to the periodic game with set period T ∗ the same solution would be valid.
Let us consider the example with n = 7, m = 2 (in the non-periodic game there is
no given T ). The solution given there is as follows: with probability 1/8 adopt unbiased
oscillations on edges (1, 2) and (6, 7) and with probability 6/8 adopt a tour of Ln of
period 2(n−1) = 12 that goes back and forth between the end nodes. This is illustrated
in Figure 6.
1               2                 3                4                5                6                 7
6/8
1/8 1/8
Figure 6: Patroller oscillates between end nodes with probability 6/8 and on edges (1, 2)
and (6, 7) each with probability 1/8 in L7.
It is easy to check that the probability that the tour of Ln (of period 12) intercepts at-
tacks at nodes 1, 2, . . . , 7 is given respectively by 2/12, 3/12, 4/12, 4/12, 4/12, 3/12, 2/12.
The 12-cycle can be written, starting at say node 3, as 3∗, 4∗, 5∗, 6∗, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 2∗, . . . ,
where ∗ indicates going to the right. Note that an attack at node 4 starting at time t
will be intercepted if the Patroller following this cycle is at one of the four steps 5, 4
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or 3∗, 4∗ out of the twelve steps in the cycle, that is, with probability 4/12. The other
probabilities are calculated in a similar manner. For example the Patroller can be at
steps 2∗ or 1 to intercept an attack at node 1 and at steps 2, 1 or 2∗ to intercept an
attack at node 2.
We now calculate the probability that the mixed strategy stated above intercepts
an attack at each node. For node 1 such an attack is intercepted with probability
2/12 by the big oscillation and with probability 1 by the oscillation on edge (1, 2).
Hence, the total interception probability is given by (6/8)(2/12) + (1/8)(1) = 1/4. An
attack in node 2 is intercepted with probability 3/12 by the big oscillation and with
probability 1 by the oscillation on edge (1, 2). Hence, the total interception proba-
bility is given by (6/8)(3/12) + (1/8)(1) = 5/16. At node 3 an attack is intercepted
with probability 4/12 by the big oscillation. Hence the total interception probability
is given by (6/8)(4/12) = 1/4. The argument for node 4 is the same as node 3 and
the interception probabilities for nodes 5, 6, 7 are the same as nodes 3, 2, 1 respectively
by symmetry. So the overall interception probabilities for nodes {1, 2, ..., 7} are given
by {1/4, 5/16, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 5/16, 1/4}. The minimum is 1/4, which is also the value of
m/(n+m−1) = 1/4, given by Papadaki el al (2016). Note that the Attacker can achieve
a successful attack with probability 1/4 by attacking equiprobably simultaneously at the
nodes of the independent set {1, 3, 5, 7}.
To compare the above analysis with the periodic game of this paper, observe that
the three oscillations used in the optimal mixed strategy above have periods T1 = T2 = 2
and T3 = 12, with least common multiple of T
∗ = 12. So this also gives a solution to the
periodic game with n = 7 and T = T ∗ = 12. Since T ∗ is even and n is odd our formula
given in Proposition 6, case 2, is 2/(n+ 1) = 1/4. The two analyses agree on the value.
Note however, that the patrolling strategy given above differs from that given by our
analysis of the periodic game with T = 12 and n = 7 given in Section 4.1, Figure 1.
Note also that for both patrolling strategies the nodes which are unfavourable to attack
are the penultimate nodes 2 and 6. This shows that the Patroller strategies that we
give in our analysis are not uniquely optimal. While this gives an alternative method of
analyzing the periodic game T = 12, n = 7, it does not solve it in general. For example
it would not solve the game for, say, T = 11.
6 Multiple Patrollers
We now consider a generalization of the game, where there are k Patrollers. The At-
tacker’s strategy set is the same, but his opponent chooses k periodic walks on Ln,
corresponding to k patrols. The attack is intercepted and the payoff is 1 if any of the
Patrollers intercept the attack.
Let V (k) denote the value of the game when there are k Patrollers, and write V
(k)
n
for the value of the k Patroller game on Ln. Suppose in the single Patroller game the
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Patroller plays first as in the k game but then picks a Patroller randomly. Thus he wins
with probability at least V (k)/k, and hence
V (k) ≤ kV. (13)
That is, k Patrollers can intercept an attack with probability at most k times the prob-
ability that a single Patroller can intercept an attack.
The estimate holds with equality if and only if the k Patrollers can jointly attack in
such a way that each one is following an optimal strategy for k = 1 and furthermore no
possible attack is simultaneously intercepted by more than one of the Patrollers.
If we assume k ≤ n/2 then it is easy to adapt our optimal strategies described in
the sections above for k = 1 to the more general game where k > 1. As an example,
take case 4, with n = 7, T = 3 and k = 3. An optimal Patroller strategy for k = 1 is
depicted in Table 2: recall that the Patroller chooses one of the 12 arrows at random
and performs a left or right p-biased oscillation, depending on the direction of the arrow,
where p = 6/7.
An optimal strategy for k = 3 simply chooses a row at random and assigns one of
the 3 Patrollers to each arrow. This clearly implies that V
(k)
n = 3Vn. For k = 2 the
Patroller chooses a row at random and randomly assigns the 2 Patrollers to 2 of the 3
arrows. Note that this extension to k > 1 Patrollers works for any k ≤ 3 but not for
k > 3. For example this particular argument does not work for k = 4. Note also that the
alternative decomposed strategy for case 4, described in Section 5.5 cannot be extended
to k > 1 Patrollers in the same way.
Similarly, for the other cases, as long as k ≤ n/2, the Patroller’s strategy for k = 1
can be extended to k > 1. We omit the details, as the extensions are straightforward.
Hence we have the following theorem.
Theorem 13 For k ≤ n/2, the value V (k)n of the k Patroller game on the line graph Ln
satisfies V
(k)
n = kVn.
It is natural to question whether, for k > n/2, the value of the game is min{kVn, 1}.
Indeed, for T even, it is easy to see that this is true, since for k > n/2, the Patroller can
win the game with probability 1 by oscillating on k covering edges.
But for T odd, it is not true. Consider the same example of n = 7 and T = 3 but
this time with k = 4 Patrollers. In this case, the bound (13) gives V
(4)
7 ≤ 4V7 = 20/21.
Suppose the Attacker employs the uniform strategy. Since T = 3 it is clear that each
of the 4 Patrollers must either choose an edge and perform a biased oscillation on that
edge, or stay at a single node. Each Patroller can only guarantee certain interception
at only one node. It follows that there are at most 4 nodes at which any attack is
intercepted with probability 1, and the maximum probability an attack is intercepted
at the remaining 3 nodes is 2/3. Hence the maximum probability of interception is
4/7 · (1) + 2/3 · (3/7) = 6/7 < 20/21, so V (4)7 ≤ 6/7 and (13) is not tight.
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To see that the value V
(4)
7 is in fact exactly equal to 6/7, consider the strategy of
the Patrollers as depicted in Table 4. This time the circle with the dot in the middle
indicates that a Patroller remains at this node, whereas an arrow, as before, denotes
performing a left or right p-biased oscillation, depending on the direction of the arrow,
taking p = 4/7. The Patrollers choose one of the four rows at random, then they are
each assigned to one of the edges corresponding to an arrow or to the node corresponding
to the circle with a dot in it.
All even numbered nodes have four arrows coming into them and using (9) the
probability an attack there is intercepted is:
p · (1) + (1− p) · T − 1
T
= (4/7) · (1) + (3/7) · (2/3) = 6/7.
Similarly, attacks at odd numbered nodes have a probability of 1/4 that there is a
stationary Patroller at that node who definitely intercepts the attack, and 3/4 probability
that there is a Patroller using an arrow going away from that node. Hence attacks at
odd numbered nodes are intercepted with probability:
1/4(1) + 3/4
(
T − p
T
)
= 6/7, by (10).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 • ⇐= • • ⇐= • • ⇐= •
• =⇒ •  • ⇐= • • ⇐= •
• =⇒ • • =⇒ •  • ⇐= •
• =⇒ • • =⇒ • • =⇒ • 
Table 4: Optimal strategy for L7 with T = 3 and k = 4.
It is not hard to show that for T = 3 and n = 7, even for k = 6 the value of the game
is strictly less than 1. In fact it is equal to 20/21 in this case (we omit the details).
7 Conclusions
This paper has begun the study of periodic patrols on the line, by giving a complete
solution to the case of short attack duration m = 2. One reason that the case m = 2
is susceptible to our analysis is that, at least for even T , the covering number can be
identified with the minimum number of patrols that are required to intercept any attack.
This is not true for large m. The periodic patrolling game is much more difficult to solve
than the unrestricted version of the game (where patrols are not required to have a given
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period). The latter can be solved for line graphs of arbitrary size and arbitrary attack
duration, as long as the time horizon is sufficiently large, as shown in Papadaki et al.
(2016).
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